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The moral ought is the raison d'être of all ethical theories. Moral philosophers have either attempted to explain why there exists an ought, prescribe an ought, or device ways to know the ought. Phenomenologists have significant contributions to this field; however ethical systems grounded on Husserl’s method are apparently weak if not inadequate especially in terms of naming the ought. Two problems seem inherent in any ethical system grounded on Husserlian phenomenology. (1) Phenomenology is essentially a descriptive method—a phenomenological ethics would simply be descriptive—without any practical significance. It cannot provide an answer to the ethical question: what should I do? (2) Whenever phenomenologists attempt to do more than describe, they are charged of promoting moral relativism; for they stress the importance of moral situations over absolute moral norms. Husserl, who is not strange to accusations of subjectivism, encouraged his readers to suspend their naïve and dogmatic understanding of the world—to bracket assumed objective meanings and to return to the things themselves. This seemingly subjective tone precluded the possibility of a phenomenological ethics prescribing non negotiable norms. However, studies made on Husserl’s research manuscripts clarify his fundamental concepts and frees phenomenology from its inherent “defects”—most notable of which is Dan Zahavi’s work on Husserl’s intersubjectivity where he reconstructs Husserl’s sense-constitution and identifies its implied metaphysics: metaphysics of intersubjectivity. He examines the metaphysical consequences of Husserl’s transcendental turn, revealing a metaphenomenology that explores a transcendental realm, essentially restructuring Husserl’s epistemology. In reinterpreting Husserl’s theory of constitution, freeing it from its subjective tendencies and revealing Husserl’s intention to go beyond epistemology, Zahavi addresses the problem of relativism and liberates Phenomenology from the limiting idea that it is simply a descriptive method. This paper, explores the ethical implications of Zahavi’s findings. It seeks to establish the groundwork for a phenomenological ethics that is not simply descriptive and does not prescribe a relative ought—an ethical theory that establishes the significant role of epoche and reduction in the determination of the intersubjectively constituted but subjectively known and situationally defined ought.   
Zahavi’s Theoretical Reconstruction 
	It is often debated if phenomenology is a philosophy or a method but it is actually both. Husserl’s critique of positivism led him to an elaborate analysis of the essential structures of consciousness. He made Brentano’s doctrine of intentionality the central thesis of his phenomenology—consciousness is always conscious of something other than itself—this he developed to expose the inadequacy of science in terms of understanding its own intentional accomplishments. He argues that necessary truths are neither reducible to psychology nor independent of consciousness—they are constituted and as such correlates of the transcendental ego. Husserl wanted to ground objectivity on consciousness. This paradoxical idea characterizes the phenomenological standpoint and distinguishes it from the natural standpoint. Husserl then described a method that would facilitate a shift from our naïve understanding of reality to seeing how things really are—that is as constitutive achievement of transcendental subjectivity. The method constitutes two movements: epoche and transcendental reduction. The phenomenological method is used whenever a person decides to take up the phenomenological standpoint—that is, understanding how consciousness knows the world without presupposing either the known or the knower.
	Although Husserl is famous for his brand of epistemology, only recently his research manuscripts were made available and this makes it possible to do a reading of phenomenology in the context of his grand scheme. Evidently Husserl attempted to go beyond epistemology, and his manuscripts reveal that he intends to introduce intersubjectivity, sociality, embodiment, historicity, language, and interpretation to his philosophy.  The manuscripts also clarify his purported subjective tendency, thus providing a clear demarcation from the Cartesian problematic. 
Husserl’s Sense-constitution and the Cartesian Problem
	The traditional understanding of phenomenology is limited to the primal realm—the realm of transcendental ego. It is this bent towards subjectivism that caused irreconcilable contradictions and made most of the concepts that Husserl introduced ambiguous. This difficulty is quite evident in his epistemological theory of constitution. Husserl insists that the world is a phenomenon and that its ontic sense is the constitutive achievement of the transcendental I. This can be interpreted in two ways: either the world is simply the creation of the subject (the world is my idea) or the world exists independently (and thus cannot be reduced to the idea of the subject) but all that I can really know is my idea of it. Both interpretations are flawed. Note that this dilemma echoes the Cartesian dichotomy, and quite certainly poses the same epistemological problem—the missing bridge. If we are trapped within our ideas (the case in whichever interpretation) then how do we know the objective world? How do we validate that there really is something outside our ideas? This of course is a dead end: when you begin with consciousness conscious only of its ideas—the tragic state of the Cartesian cogito—you end up with nothing but consciousness and its ideas. This has subjectivism written all over it, and purportedly, the same goes with phenomenology—that is if we simply assume that Husserl had the same starting point as Descartes and his method merely his own stubborn attempt to escape the thinking self. However Zahavi (2001) offers an alternative interpretation:
          The intentional “relation” between act and object is precisely intentional—not real.    . . . [t]he act does not really intrinsically contain the object in itself . . . there is a decisive difference between the mode of givenness of the intentional lived experience as a really intrinsic content and the mode of givenness of the intentional object. That which is intended is not immanent to the act but is transcendent to the act. (p. 6-7)  	 
 There is no dichotomy, and the bridge problem is at best illusory, for Husserl begins not with the thinking self alone, consciousness is conscious of something other than consciousness itself. The self is given as constituting self and the world is given as constituted. Far from being a form of realism (where the entities exist outside the relationship) the self and the world are given only within the relationship, outside of which nothing is intelligible. What we have then is a realism within an idealism—phenomenological idealism. Every constitution includes a moment of facticity. The subject is essentially a world-experiencing subject and the world is essentially experienced. 
Husserl’s Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity and the Constitution of Objectivity
Zahavi (2001) claims however that Husserl did not conclude his analysis here, in its complete sense transcendental subjectivity is transcendental intersubjectivity, and this is the actual correlate of the world: 
The disclosure of the constitutive significance has led to a decisive modification and fine-tuning of [Husserl’s] concept of absolute subjectivity. While at first the transcendental subjectivity disclosed through the transcendental reduction is indeterminate, in further reflection it is displayed in its fullness as transcendental intersubjectivity, since the deepest and most universal self-meditation of the philosophizing ego leads to the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity. Absolute self-cognition soon leads to we-cognition, to a cognition of the absolute total subjectivity. (p. 63)
Taken in its radical sense, the reduction actually goes beyond the realm of the transcendental subject. It reveals a transcendental sphere where the ontic sense of the world is related back to a constitutive act performed by transcendental intersubjectivity. It is here that the transcendental subject is revealed to be transcendental intersubjectivity—the ego belongs to a community of subjects (all possible and actual)—and the world as originally constituted by this community (transcendental intersubjectivity). Hence, the world is revealed as a transcendental phenomenon—its sense only manifests within the experience of the mundane subject. However its very nature is such that it transcends the actual experience of the mundane I for it is a correlate of transcendental intersubjectivity—the community of all possible and actual subjects. This implies that the objective world is an idea that manifests itself only in the experience of the  subject—its ontic sense is essentially subjective-relative. Outside the experience of the subject there is no world strictly speaking. Thus whatever is objective is constituted only in the experience of the subject.
Furthermore, Zahavi’s analysis discloses that the constitutive act is intersubjective. Every subject is a member of the anonymous we. And although it is only within the experience of this I that the world manifests its sense, the constitutive act of the subject is performed on behalf of the community of anonymous subjects. Hence every subject and thus every constitutive act it performs is transcendental—the constitution of the world-sense although subjective is intersubjective. 
Zahavi’s analysis reveals an implied metaphysics in Husserl’s phenomenology—a tripartite structure of reality consisting of the constituted world, the constituting self, and the constituting intersubjectivity. This metaphysics, true to Husserl’s methodology, is not simply assumed but is grounded still on transcendental subjectivity—it is a metaphysics born out of an epistemological analysis. The reduction to the primordial realm reveals (1) the self as contained within a we precisely as a member of the community of rational subjects, and (2) the world as a correlate of this constituting community. 
Ethical Implications of Husserl’s Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity
Zahavi rid Husserl’s phenomenology off its subjective inclination—his interpretation distances Husserl from Descartes, consequently dismissing the idea that Husserl’s phenomenology is as problematic as Descartes’ epistemology. But more importantly Zahavi was able to salvage Husserl’s phenomenology from the limiting notion that it is simply a method of describing experience; and rightfully so, for any understanding of reality would necessarily imply a philosophy of reality. Husserl’s attempt to redefine certainty necessitates that he begin with an analysis of our way of knowing but knowing how we know is just the first step. 
Zahavi’s findings address the problems inherent in any ethical system grounded on phenomenology: the lack of practical relevance and moral relativism. Within this framework it is possible to construct a phenomenological ethics that (1) prescribes a way of knowing the ought—a method that provides an answer to the question: what should I do?—and more importantly (2) presents a description of the ought that goes beyond subjectivism: the intersubjectively constituted ought.  
Husserl’s metaphysics of intersubjectivity enables us to explore a metaphysical understanding of the moral ought which necessitates a preliminary description of the moral experience. We argue that the ought is constituted intersubjectively but only known within the intentional experience of the situated subject, and thus necessarily relative to moral situations. Zahavi’s clarification of Husserl’s sense-constitution qualifies the nature of the ought as a constitutive achievement of transcendental intersubjectivity—the ought is neither absolute nor relative, (objective nor subjective) but constituted and as such absolute-relative, (inter) subjective, rational, transcendent and situated. Husserl’s sense-constitution establishes the constitutive role of epoche and reduction—suspending our naïve presuppositions raises our analysis of experience to the intersubjective realm where objectivity is defined as the constitutive accomplishment of intersubjectivity. Epoche and reduction play the same constitutive role in the constitution of the moral ought.  
The (Inter) Subjective-Situated Moral Ought and its Subjective Determination
	Ethical discussions are filled with oppositions—good and bad, intrinsic and extrinsic, means and ends—but what precedes these and perhaps what is more pressing is between absolute and relative. Absolute and relative ethics present two mutually exclusive understanding of the moral ought. The former insists on the objectivity of the imperative while the latter stresses its flexibility and its openness to moral situations. 
The Kantian ethics best exemplifies absolutism. Kant claims that the moral imperative is universal and that it comes prior to experience—it is known a priori. On the other hand relative ethics argues that the imperative is relative to moral situations; hence for relativists it is morally permissible to go against pre-established laws if the situation demands this. 
Both theories it seems are deficit. Absolutists fail to recognize the diversity and inherent complexities of moral situations. They prescribe a norm that is indifferent to moral situations. Quite understandably this idea does not appeal to individuals who are aware of the multifaceted nature of the moral experience. Universalizing ethical principles make them less practical. With its insensitive tone absolute ethics renders itself obsolete in a post-modern world. 
Ethical relativism while enticing in many ways promotes ideals that if left unchecked may result to moral decay or even anarchy. Here the ought could easily be reduced to the person’s subjective preferences—influenced by his/her culture, religion, and tradition. Granting the ought a relative status is a slippery slope—eventually it loses its normative value. 
	A phenomenological understanding of the moral ought that takes into account Husserl’s sense-constitution and metaphysics of intersubjectivity goes beyond the traditional absolute-relative dichotomy. The ought is revealed as the constitutive accomplishment of transcendental intersubjectivity. It is intersubjective but relative to the moral situations. The ought manifests itself only in moral situations—in essence the ought is the ought of the situation. However its sense is intersubjective. It is relative and is revealed only within the subjective understanding of the subject but it transcends subjectivity—for its actual sense is intersubjective.  But it is not completely objective or absolute for it is not known outside the moral situation of the subject and is essentially relative to moral situations. Its manifestation is peculiar to the situation in which it manifests—the ought is situated. It is not indifferent to moral situations because the situation defines the ought: given my situation, what ought I do? Outside its subjective manifestation the ought is unintelligible. But the ought transcends its subjective manifestation for it is primordially the constitutive accomplishment of transcendental intersubjectivity, it is intersubjective in nature but subjectively known and situationally defined. 
Although the determination of the ought is influenced by the horizontal understanding of the subject and characterized by the moral situation, it has an intersubjective sense. Hence it is not reduced to norms established by existing (actual) subjects alone, for it is constituted by the community of subjects both possible and actual. The determination of the manifested ought is situated for the act of knowing is both cultural and historical. However primordially it transcends both culture and history.
Moral reasoning thus phenomenologically described is the subjective determination of the intersubjective ought. However the subject to successfully determine the ought revealed within his/her situation must necessarily transform his/her subjective understanding to intersubjective understanding. The ought transcends the horizontal understanding of the subject. It is open only to intersubjective understanding for its sense is intersubjective. 
Epoche and Reduction in Moral Reasoning								A typical phenomenological description of the moral experience gives us three defining moments: moment of understanding, moment of decision, and moment of action.	 The first moment involves the awareness of the situation, of the choices (modes of action) and their consequences. An ethical situation poses an urgent question: what ought I do? Choices then relative to the situation and their consequences are revealed. On the basis of this reflective awareness the person then makes a decision that he/she eventually realizes in action. This poses a practical problem. The choices that a person sees, determine the choice that he/she would make and consequently the action that he/she will perform. However what choices he/she does see depends on his/her horizontal (historical and generative) understanding of the situation (hence two different individuals in the same situation would not necessarily see the same choices). The horizontal understanding of the person determines and thus limits the choices that he/she sees. 
This is the case in moral reasoning. The subject in determining the intersubjective ought would always be limited by his/her horizontal understanding—any act of subjective determination is necessarily situated.  The subject then to successfully carry out this act must transcend his/her horizontal understanding. Epoche as a method of bracketing subjective assumptions and reduction as a method of intersubjective reflection thus play important roles in moral reasoning. Epoche is the suspension of our naïve understanding of reality, and as such enables the person in an ethical situation to bracket the same naïve understanding of the ought. By bracketing his/her moral assumptions the person would be able to see that his/her choices are limited by his/her peculiar way of understanding. He/she would be able to recognize that the ought demanded by the situation transcends his/her finitude (history, culture, tradition). Every situation is unique and so is the ought relatively manifested in it.  Epoche in moral reasoning is the questioning of pre-existing norms, understanding them in the light of the individual’s unique ethical situation. Reduction facilitates the movement from subjective to intersubjective consciousness. Here the person gains a reflective awareness of the intersubjective ought. The person after suspending his/her assumed moral beliefs reduces the question to its intersubjective sense: Given the same ethical situation, what ought any person do?  
Conclusion 
The following ideas are identified as ethical implications of Zahavi’s reconstruction of Husserl’s Metaphysics of Intersubjectivity: 1) The moral ought is intersubjectively constituted, 2) the intersubjective ought is situated, and 3) moral reasoning is the subjective determination of the intersubjective ought. 
We have developed the idea that a phenomenological description of the moral ought reveals its intersubjective sense in spite of its subjective manifestation and relativity to moral situations. Our analysis also establishes that both epoche and reduction play important roles in moral reasoning—phenomenologically described as the subjective determination of the intersubjective ought.  
We assert that the moral ought, phenomenologically described, although embodied in moral situations and subjectively known is intersubjectively constituted. The ought is objective in the sense that it goes beyond the limited horizon of the subject however its sense is intersubjective and thus relative to moral situations and to all subjects both possible and actual. We stressed then that the subject has the moral responsibility to transcend his/her subjective understanding and perform a reflective act that reduces the experience to its intersubjective sense—for it is only here that the intersubjectively constituted ought can be determined. However we are not simply dismissing the role of pre-existing norms. On the contrary we recognize their significance in moral reasoning for they enable the subject to widen his/her horizon. Without such norms the subjective determination of the ought would be greatly determined by and limited to the subject’s preferences. Social norms serve as normative guides but they are inadequate because the ought is essentially relative to moral situations. Thus the ought is as peculiar as the moral situation in which and only within which it is known. Two different situations may demand varying moral imperatives. But precisely as relative-subjective (relative to all subjects) that ought is absolute and universal. 
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